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Much recent research has focused on examining various binary contradictions and employing 
metaphors pertaining to border security. Ultimately, this article argues that existing debates and 
metaphors are inadequate in describing what is understood and agreed upon in the literature in 
terms of borders. This article proposes a refinement of existing theory for contemporary borders, 
employing Baudrillard (1981) concept of ‘simulation’. The metaphor of the ‘simulated border’ 
functions to avoid debates surrounding geospatiality while also incorporating aspects of risk 
society and control in concluding that borders are anything but organic security environments, 
with the ‘stretched screens’ (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to produce dividuals that are 
tested within games of security to govern mobility anywhere in time or space. 
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Much of the contemporary literature in the interdisciplinary field of border studies has 
focused attention on the changing nature of borders from several contexts. These shifts have 
been well-documented in relation to the Canadian, U.S., and European literature in terms of: 1) 
the development of ‘smart borders’ (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-Boucher 
2008), including examinations of travel documents (Lyon 2009; McPhail et al. 2012; Muller 
2009; Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Salter 2011; Sparke 2006) and the use of biometrics and other 
risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; and Muller 2011); 
2) examinations of border geospatiality (or lack thereof), including employment of logics of 
‘remote control’ (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritoralization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 
2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as ‘everywhere’ (Lyon 2005), the border as part of 
a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form 
of visual ‘security performance’ (de Lint 2008; Rumford 2006) pushing security functions 
‘beyond the border’ away from their traditional geographical limits; and 3) the securitization of 
refugees, irregular migrants, and citizenship (see for example Bigo 2002; Coutin 2005; Coutin 
2010; Dauvergne 2007; Duffield 2010; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; McNevin 2010; Salter 
2008). 
 Various binary debates as well as metaphors have been employed in the literature to 
attempt to explore borders theoretically while also incorporating the aforementioned disparate 
findings. Such metaphors have conceptualized borders as ‘filters’ (Muller 2011) and as 
‘firewalls’ (Walters 2006a). This article will argue these metaphors have varying levels of 
success in avoiding pitfalls associated with the aforementioned literature, namely being unable to 
reconcile debates in the literature surrounding binary border mandates as well as opposing 
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geographical imaginaries. Border binaries also fail in incorporating previous findings related to a 
harmonized security-economy nexus, notions of risk, and also fall into a ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 
1994) that only serves to obscure other research. 
This article ultimately proposes a revised theory and metaphor for contemporary border 
governance toward producing a representation more consistent with what is presently known 
(and agreed upon) in the field of borders and border security. The works of Baudrillard (1981) on 
simulation and Bogard (1996) on the simulation of surveillance will be especially instructive. By 
performing a content analysis of border training documents and manuals obtained via Access to 
Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), 
this article will carry forward the argument that borders proceed as simulations, reducing 
personal narrative to binary data that allows for the governance of mobility and flows via risk 
within societies of control (Deleuze 1995), while also making borders transmutable anywhere 
social life is securitized irrespective of considerations of time and/or space.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
BORDER BINARIES 
As Newman (2006: 176) indicates, notions of difference and ‘othering’ in the form of 
binary pairings (inside versus outside, here versus there, and so forth) characterize much of the 
contemporary border discourse. Many of these binary distinctions have been brought about, as 
Rumford (2006: 155) contends, by a renewed theoretical focus on the changing nature of borders 
originating from many of the themes central to contemporary social theory, including 
globalization, cosmopolitanism, networked communities, mobilities, and flows. Parker and 
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Vaughan-Williams (2009: 584) in citing Derrida (1976) locate the seduction of binaries in their 
ability to produce a sense of security and certainty (pure imaginaries). 
 Such debates unfold in several zero-sum arguments related to governing borders, 
including: 1) security versus economy, 2) open borders versus closed borders, 3) separating a 
coherent inside from a chaotic outside, and 4) borders as geospatially specific versus borders as 
virtual or diffused. The first three binaries fall apart for two primary reasons. Firstly, recent 
literature suggests that border policies have moved toward coupling security and economic 
concerns not in opposition but rather as a mutually reinforcing (and indistinguishable) pair in the 
form of the security-economy nexus (see for example Ashby 2014; Coleman 2005; Lalonde 
2012; Leese 2016; Sparke 2006). Secondly, and relatedly, the nearly universal acceptance in 
border literature that risk has come to dominate border policing and mobility governance efforts 
(see for example Aas 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Muller 2010a; Muller 
2011), means binaries as well as distinctions like ‘open’ versus ‘closed’ are replaced by the 
governance of flows via data, which presupposes circulation.  
 The fourth binary requires closer examination. The assertion that borders have moved 
beyond the territorial limits of the sovereign state is well-supported in the literature (i.e. Broeders 
and Hampshire 2013; Mountz 2011; Salter and Mutlu 2013). For instance, Broeders and 
Hampshire (2013) discuss the contemporary digitization of the border as a refinement of the 
logic of ‘remote control’, in which “states project their immigration control measures overseas so 
that they identify and process would-be immigrants well before they arrive at the territorial 
border” (p. 1202). Through such digitization, associated security and control technologies as 
forms of governance have spread away from physical borders, and borders are said to experience 
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a concomitant shift from territorial boundaries of states to a potentially infinite number of sites 
(Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 1207).  
The debate surrounding deterritorialization of borders is ultimately an uneasy one. While 
Lyon (2005) (in)famously declares “the border is everywhere”, Vaughan-Williams (2010), for 
instance, concludes that the ‘offshoring’ of borders and security does not necessarily eradicate 
“commonsensical geographical notions about the location of borders” (p. 1074). Vaughan-
Williams demonstrates this by exploring the UK’s configuration of the border as part of a 
‘security continuum’ that accommodates the continued use of physical borders alongside other 
enforcement locales. Others (de Lint 2008; Rumford 2006) point to the physical border as an 
important site of ‘security performances’ for states wishing to display to their citizenry that they 
have control over the flow of people and goods into and out of a state. In essence then, this 
literature contends that physical borders serve at the very least as sites for ‘security theatre’ 
(Schneier 2006: 38 as cited in Zedner 2009: 22) in the form of ritualistic shows (or acts) of 
security.  
 Ultimately, it can be concluded that the interdisciplinary study of borders falls into what 
Agnew (1994) refers to as the “territorial trap”, or “the set of geographical assumptions that have 
combined to obscure the historicity and mutability of political space and territory” (Walters 
2006a: 141). In other words, the interdisciplinary obsession with border geospatiality has served 
to obscure research focused on other aspects of borders and security. 
 
BORDER METAPHORS 
Walters (2006b) cites Balibar’s (2002) notion of the ‘ubiquity of borders’ in suggesting 
that rather than disappearing, borders are actually proliferating and becoming “‘a grid ranging 
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over the new social space’ rather than a line separating it from outside” (Balibar 2002: 84-85 as 
cited in Walters 2006b: 199). Walters (2006a) develops the firewall metaphor as a possible 
alternative that avoids fixation with notions of geography. Firewalls basically function to identify 
‘risky’ (or black-listed) data and subsequently, “Malicious packages are blocked, returned or 
perhaps ‘quarantined’” (Walters 2006a: 152). Simultaneously, firewalls allow ‘green-listed’ data 
to move about the network. The firewall also has the ability to examine ‘grey-listed’ (or 
unknown) data and compare it against black-listed data for similarities, making decisions about 
whether to allow or deny the data based on risk. Thus the firewall metaphor allows moving 
beyond notions of borders as ‘walls’ to instead employing a filter logic in which borders 
ultimately aspire not to simply arrest movement, but rather “to produce and distribute both 
mobility and immobility” (Walters 2006a: 152).  
Unfortunately, this metaphor only partially explains contemporary borders. Remote 
control implies that risky subjects and commodities are often intercepted by visa offices, airlines, 
commercial carriers, and so forth before they reach physical borders. Firewalls do not function 
via remote control to block packets before they leave their ‘source location’. Rather, firewalls 
block packets of data at the back end – the gateway of the network – much like physical borders. 
Additionally, the firewall is completely ‘responsible’ for blocking risky data, and third parties 
such as ISPs, businesses, or individuals are largely uninvolved in protecting other third-party 
networks. Furthermore, while borders use databases to analyze risk associated with mostly 
known individuals (developed further below), firewalls must analyze disguised data packets 
against security cases the firewall (or other firewalls) have documented in the past. In short, 
unlike borders, firewalls are largely ‘flying blind’, without third-party assistance, as they combat 
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risks at the gateway of the network exclusively. In trying to avoid issues of geography, Walters 
(2006a) ultimately ends up describing traditional sovereign borders exclusively. 
Muller (2011: 104) argues that as governance efforts shift from governing migration 
toward instead governing mobility under neoliberal risk-management strategies, borders should 
be imagined more as filters rather than as limits. As voluntary risk-management programs such 
as NEXUS in North America become more prevalent, the border begins to act as a filter, 
separating mobilities based on membership rights in what Muller (2010b: 80) calls ‘multi-speed 
citizenship’. The border identifies ‘safe citizenship’ and serves to sort or filter according to an 
individual’s digitized citizenship, or ‘netizenship’ (Muller 2010b: 83).  
While the filter metaphor arguably avoids binary oppositions and geographical arguments 
while also adequately representing how trusted trader and traveler programs function, this 
metaphor also only partially explores how borders function to govern mobility. Filters are 
generally designed as membranes used to govern the flow of substances. They act to separate 
unwanted particles that are dissimilar to the desired substance. Other particles are confined 
within the membrane while the desired substance is permitted to flow through to its final 
destination. Filters work to separate different physical properties from each other. They do so by 
being able to interrupt dissimilar particles. Unlike borders, which tend to allow the movement of 
certain levels of risk, filters are low-tech in that they are generally not ‘programmed’ to discern 
between different levels of potentially ‘risky’ particles – they simply act to block all potentially 
risky particles (regardless of their actual risk). When water is filtered, a particle of dirt that poses 
little threat to human health will be blocked just as often as a deadly toxin like lead. Also, similar 
to the firewall metaphor, filters only work where installed and tend to protect a certain reservoir 
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or space (inside) from exterior particles (outside), which ignores the use of modern technologies 
of remote control to arrest flows before they can reach filters. 
    
REVISING BORDER THEORY 
 Any revised metaphor for borders must be able to employ everything that is currently 
agreed upon in the literature regarding borders and security. This includes: 1) the work of 
bordering and related border technologies unfolds at an increasing variety of official state sites in 
addition to unofficial public and private non-state sites (both within individual nation states and 
around the world); 2) traditional physical, sovereign, and geographic borders persist and continue 
to perform various governance functions (regardless of the aforementioned developments); 3) 
borders and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk vis-à-vis 
information contained in databases; 4) borders operate by responsibilizing third parties 
(individuals, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth) in collecting and reporting data on 
behalf of the state; 5) vis-à-vis the use of databases and information in governing risk, borders 
are inherently part of security continua, working alongside other policing and intelligence 
agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in producing ‘security’ (however 
currently conceived); and 6) borders continue to provide the function of securitizing and 
governing various mobilities and flows (of people, financial instruments, commercial goods, and 
so forth).  
 In addition, this revised metaphor must also consider borders within the context of 
governance. The literature has undoubtedly established borders as technologies of governance 
(see for example Aas 2011; O’Connor and de Lint 2009; Pratt 2010; Rygiel 2012) including as 
tools in biopolitical governance (Rygiel 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Governmentality 
 10 
analyses consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality 
thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are 
employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Rose and Miller 2008: 16). In terms of 
biopolitics – or the governance of life itself – borders function not by simply isolating and 
enclosing individuals to execute disciplinary power over them, but rather function to permit 
circulation, flow, and movement while identifying and cancelling out dangerous circulations 
(Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1078). As such, biopolitical borders are seen as conforming to 
characteristics of Deleuze’s (1995) control society, in which governance is no longer confined to 
institutions (as was characteristic of disciplinary societies) but rather is increasingly “more 
supple, dispersed, and nebulous” (Walters 2002: 574).  
 
SOCIAL SIMULACRA  
While early social interactionists like Erving Goffman posited that social interaction and 
indeed social life unfolds within ‘theatres’ as if one is examining actors on a stage, Baudrillard 
(1981) argues instead that the theatre has been displaced by what he calls “the satellization of the 
real” (Baudrillard 1981: 149). Whereas theatre is employed to feign or dissimilate reality, 
simulation instead serves to employ logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions between 
‘real’ and ‘fake’ in “an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its operational double, 
a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real 
and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1981: 4). The real never has to be feigned 
again given simulation is opposed to representation, employing the ‘sign’ not as an equivalent 
but rather as the negation or replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981: 11). The sign 
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does not simply stand in for the ‘real’, rather, it removes the real and becomes indistinguishable 
from it.  
Simulations in the realm of security unfold as a planned model of infallibility 
characteristic of maximal security and deterrence (Baudrillard 1981: 65). The object of the game 
of security is the simulation of certain risks, threats, and events becoming real (prevention), 
adapting to their hypothetical inevitability (resilience), and ultimately pre-empting them from 
becoming real. According to Bogard (1996), surveillance has also entered the realm of 
simulation, with technologies like computer profiling serving to simulate surveillance “in the 
sense that they precede and redouble a means of observation” and produce “surveillance in 
advance of surveillance, a technology of ‘observation before the fact’” (p. 27). And ultimately, 
simulations come to govern ‘the social’ in its entirety: “This is the true nuclear fallout: the 
meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. 
Here, too, nothing will be left to chance” (Baudrillard 1981: 63).  
The simulation of security in relation to borders is explored by de Lint (2008). He 
concludes that a sovereign may employ simulation to generate “monsters” that do not exist in 
reality (de Lint 2008: 177). In terms of borders specifically, de Lint employs a Foucauldian 
perspective in concluding that the border is a site of performance whereby the sovereign (vis-à-
vis petty sovereigns) can stage political violence alongside the frugality associated with 
liberalism in producing logics of exclusion (de Lint 2008: 180). The border is a stage serving to 
“cut down abject others or to manipulate subjects / individuals / cohorts with shocking 
discretionary displays” (de Lint 2008: 180).  However, de Lint conceptualizes simulation (and 
thus also borders) within the context of the theatre of early social interactionism, as a way of 
‘acting out’ and producing metastable border logics elsewhere (de Lint 2008: 181). He neglects 
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to consider that simulation does not simply work to produce a stage to screen the performance of 
the sovereign for all to see, but rather simulation (as Baudrillard would contend) serves to 
remove the stage completely and replace it with something else entirely, namely an abstraction.  
Simulation is also employed by Vaughan-Williams (2010) in examining the virtuality of 
the sovereign ban characteristic of the biopolitics of border security. As the sovereign shifts from 
governing via discipline to instead ‘regularizing’ life through biopower, security begins to 
function not by arresting movement but rather by permitting circulation and flow (Vaughan-
Williams 2010: 1078). Accordingly, border policies have shifted from an ‘old border’ mentality 
characterized exclusively by governing mobility at physical borders to a “biopolotical apparatus 
of security in its mobility and enhancement of liberal subjects' movement” (Vaughan-Williams 
2010: 1078). Borders become characterized within the context of a continuum, spreading to a 
variety of sites away from traditional physical borders in attempting to govern mobility. Border 
security is therefore explained within the context of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulation, with 
neoliberal subjects made virtual (and thus manageable) through technologies of pre-emption, 
including, for instance, “algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of 
populations” (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1080).  
Vaughan-Williams’ discussion of simulation is limited to the extent it does not provide a 
concrete explanation of how simulation has served to replace the ‘reality’ of border security with 
signs. His metaphor hinges on several taken-for-granted conclusions that require closer 
examination. For instance, Vaughan-Williams never makes clear how the virtuality of identity is 
used by border agents within the continuum to produce the sovereign ban (other than vague 
conclusions that pre-emption and risk are somehow involved). Vaughan-Williams (2010: 1077) 
also employs Walters’ (2006a) flawed conception of the firewall as a metaphor for how border 
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security continua function. Lastly, Vaughan-Williams seems to default to a panoptic 
understanding of the simulation of borders despite his reliance on biopolitics to frame his 
argument. He does not consider how simulated borders function within post-panoptic societies of 
control.  
 
THE SIMULATION OF SURVEILLANCE 
It is through this conceptualization that contemporary borders are best explored – not as 
sites par excellence for security performances, but rather as part of the simulation of security and 
surveillance whereby there is no longer a distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy’. According 
to Bogard (1996: 9), simulations allow the gap between virtual control and actual control to 
disappear. What Bogard refers to as telematics societies (societies that perform governance 
functions ‘at a distance’) employ simulation technologies toward cutting the time of the 
transmission of data to zero (Bogard 1996: 9). Accordingly: 
This, for Baudrillard, is our own era, where the circulation of sign-images 
dominate, but rather than being ‘false’ images, now have the function of 
concealing the fact that reality itself is absent behind its representation (Bogard 
1996: 11). 
 
Bogard refers to this as panoptic imagery whereby the architecture of control and orders of space 
and time characteristic of institutions (see Foucault 1975) are replaced by ‘cyberachitectures’ as 
well as coding designed to produce images onscreen anywhere and anytime (Bogard 1996: 19). 
Reality becomes whatever is programmed within the simulation, with images (or signs) in the 
simulation serving not as copies of ‘the real’, but rather as replacements for ‘the real’ (Bogard 
1996: 20). Derrida (1972) discusses the importance of signs in that “The sign represents the 
present in its absence… The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence” (p. 9). 
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Signs are ultimately coded and stored in databases as data doubles or dividuals (Deleuze 
1992). Indeed, as Dijstelbloem and Broeders (2015) indicate, the inclusion / exclusion dichotomy 
is no longer useful in terms of describing border control technologies. Rather, in terms of 
migration, “the insider–outsider distinction is being replaced by a much more heterogeneous 
handling of technologically constructed non-publics” (Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015: 23). 
Accordingly: 
To the authorities at least, [the signs] would become in some ways more real 
than our real selves, because they would stand in for and verify the reality of 
those selves in ways that are, or have the potential to be, absolutely certain… 
Simulation, in fact, would in such cases carry surveillance, the unmasking of 
reality, to its logical limit and conclusion – perfect information on individuals, 
perfect exposure, and perfect discipline (Bogard 1996: 21). 
 
According to Bogard, dividuals are reproduced like a photocopy through a Xerox (photocopier) 
machine in that “Any original only exists, for the Xerox, to copy, and thus, for all it cares, as a 
copy” (Bogard 1996: 45). The clone of the original serves as a perfect repetition of the original 
such that it stands in irrefutably for the original. As this process occurs and dividuals become the 
replicated identity of individuals, and databases proliferate to handle incessant collection of data 
and refine data doubles as necessary. These technologies serve to simulate surveillance in that 
they generate a single profile (dividual) from infinitesimal data points derived from various 
sources (Bogard 1996: 27). Such virtual systems, according to Bogard (1996: 23) are indifferent 
to human history and personal narrative. The image of the dividual becomes the undisputed 
‘history in advance’ for authorities to review (Bogard 1996: 23). According to Bogard (1996: 44) 
all this promises full front-end control by infallibly guaranteeing certain flows in advance while 
abandoning the need for strategies of monitoring and security performances. Simulated 
technologies of surveillance ultimately attempt to produce “the transcendence of limits of time, 
space, life and death, and the body” (Bogard 1996: 51). As such they are transmutable – anyone 
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can plug into such databases anywhere and immediately call forth dividuals and manage flows 
with or without the presence of individuals. 
 
BORDER SIMULACRUM AND CONTROL 
Borders as Simulacrum 
 Borders proceed exactly in the way Bogard (1996) demonstrates that surveillance is 
simulated. According to the principles outlined above: 1) the work of bordering and related 
border technologies unfold at an increasing variety of sites, and 2) traditional physical borders 
persist and continue to perform various functions. States increasingly perform mobility and 
border governance at a distance, employing visa offices overseas, international policing agencies, 
third-party commercial carriers, airlines, academic institutions, social welfare agencies, and a 
variety of other actors in both policing mobility and assisting in information collection on 
individuals, corporations, and commodities. Such diffusion, as Ericson (2007:4) contends, 
develops in an attempt to reconcile the fact that ‘security’ is very much an imaginary given it 
requires knowledge of a future that is ultimately unknowable. Such reliance on telematic policing 
means states must solve the problem of governing mobilities and flows in advance of and also at 
physical borders. To this end, as Bogard (1996: 9) illustrates, surveillance (and indeed policing 
functions) related to borders can be simulated to eliminate the gap between virtual and physical 
control and cut the time of the transmission of data to zero. 
 Such simulation is perfected by the third principle of modern borders, namely, borders 
and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk. As Ericson (2007: 
6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the future is through ‘scientific’ measures of risk. 
Data collection proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in governing the 
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future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals and other entities 
responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own security and prosperity 
(Ericson 2007: 6). In terms of borders (and following the fourth principle outlined above), states 
responsibilize a variety of third parties (visa offices, passport agencies, international policing 
agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, private citizens, and so forth) in providing 
data collection functions in advance of physical borders. Accordingly, technologies of 
governance such as carrier sanctions redesign such spaces as “semi-formal spaces of migration 
control…” (Walters 2006b: 194). These third parties ultimately become part of border security 
assemblages – in the style of Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) surveillant assemblage – and, by 
extension, security continua that rely (in part) on borders (the fifth principle outlined above). 
Such data collection contributes to the formation of data doubles (or dividuals) in databases. 
These images (or signs) as part of simulation serve not as copies of ‘the real’, but rather as 
replacements for ‘the real’ (Bogard 1996: 20).  
Whenever someone enters the border security assemblage (when attempting to obtain a 
visa, when checking in at the airport, when arriving at a physical border, and so forth), his or her 
body and personal narrative no longer serve as an identity for analysis. Rather, much like the 
Xerox machine, the original exists only insofar as it brings forth its replacement (the dividual) 
onto the ‘stretched screens’ (Lyon 2009) of border agents. Personal narrative is rendered 
irrelevant as agents already have what is perceived to be a ‘history in advance’ (Bogard 1996: 
23), which is used to govern mobility via risk. 
Long before individuals reach physical borders, they have already become part of the 
border security assemblage, the simulation of security, and have been coded as dividuals. They 
have (in many ways) been pre-selected prior to arrival. Consider travelers intending to travel to 
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another country via an airport. Even before they are permitted to board an airplane, individuals 
are rendered as dividuals and can be excluded in a variety of ways. This process begins when 
individuals attempt to obtain travel documents (i.e. passports). This serves the function of 
creating dividuals in databases, cross-referencing new dividuals with established dividuals 
contained in existing databases, and ultimately serves to exclude: 1) risky others, for example, 
certain classes of criminals and those suspected of terrorism who are banned from obtaining a 
passport in their country of origin, 2) those without the ability to establish prior identity (i.e. 
those without birth records and other required identity documents), and 3) those (primarily) in 
the global south too poor to purchase a passport or unable to access a passport office.  
In many cases, individuals must secure a visa prior to departure in order to travel to their 
destination country. This part of the border assemblage allows agents to further cross-reference 
(now established) dividuals with various databases to assess risk, allows for the collection of 
biometrics for positive identification on the front end (at the visa office) and eventually on the 
back end (at the physical border), tracks the movement (including failed attempts) of dividuals, 
and excludes: 1) actual or suspected criminals, terrorists, and other dangerous or high-risk 
‘others’, 2) people without valid passports, 3) those who are impoverished and unable to afford a 
visa or access a visa office, and 4) individuals from certain ‘banned’ countries.  
Lastly, responsibilized private agents working for airlines at international airports collect 
data that serves to further establish identity at check-in and adds this information to databases for 
border officials to examine prior to and during arrival, cross-references the dividual with prior 
established international and nation-specific databases such as no-fly lists, and excludes: 1) 
individuals too impoverished to afford tickets or without access to an international airport, 2) 
individuals without a valid visa or identity document, 3) anyone carrying weapons and/or 
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dangerous goods at security checkpoints, 4) unlimited travel based on carrier routing, and 5) 
those dividuals deemed too risky to fly (i.e. on a no-fly list). 
In short, before reaching a physical border, travelers transiting through airports – 
depending on their citizenship and visa requirements of the destination country – may be 
subjected to no fewer than three identity verifications, one biometric data collection, three 
identity cross-references with pre-established databases to assess risk, and greater than ten ways 
to be excluded from travel before even boarding an airplane. International arrivals customs and 
immigration checkpoints at airports are therefore only receiving a very small and pre-coded 
fraction of travelers out of all possible travelers in the world. According to Duffield (2010), it is 
through such mechanisms that the policing of migration alongside global development 
governance can be seen as complicit in producing a ‘planetary order’ confining large swaths of 
the global (south) population in situ. In essence, the vast majority of airport arrivals are ‘ideal’ 
types of flows that pass all checks and balances and comply with pre-coded risk-management 
technologies. These travelers have also already been established as dividuals in databases and are 
therefore ‘known’ to officials prior to arriving. They hold the proper passwords necessary for 
mobility within the simulation (explored below). While those arriving at land borders are 
theoretically subject to less prior scrutiny, the potential ‘flood’ of mobility is still controlled in a 
variety of ways via producing dividuals and within simulated borders. This process is enhanced 
by policies such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that mandate the use of passports at 





Borders as Control 
To see borders as disciplinary apparatuses of exclusion and ‘the ban’ is to be definitively 
retrograde. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites and risk is employed to accomplish 
telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, borders as technologies of governance 
effectively abandon exclusive reliance on back-end disciplinary governance in favour instead of 
front-end control. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two poles in disciplinary societies: 
“the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that 
indicates his or her position within a mass” (p. 5). Power in disciplinary societies is exercised 
through the individual and the mass via institutions. Conversely, in societies of control, the 
signature or number is replaced by “a code: the code is a password… The numerical language of 
control is made of codes that mark access… We no longer find ourselves dealing with the 
mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, 
or ‘banks’ (Deleuze 1992:5). Individuals are replaced in border simulations by dividuals 
generated in databases through aggregating bits of data. Dividuals come to form ‘passwords’ 
(Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters 
of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access 
– they are pure simulation. To agents responsible for border governance, such passwords become 
“more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996: 21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable 
first-order simulations (or copies) of the individual. However, such passwords are, in reality, not 
reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than aggregated data derived from prior 
movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and associations. In other words, dividuals are 
nothing more than the aggregate of past actions and behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-
management practices. Accordingly, a society must code in order to control flows. Non-coded 
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flows represent a threat in that they may not be controlled, and therefore serve as “the flood, the 
deleuge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes” (Deleuze 1971). Risk 
societies rely on the imaginary of perfect knowledge of flows to attempt to control them and 
regulate mobility and access. 
Baudrillard (1981) makes the connection between simulation and societies of control 
abundantly clear through his examination of an early reality TV program focused on the Loud 
family. While portrayed as an organic and ‘raw’ examination of the American family simply 
going about life as if cameras were not present (something Baudrilliard sees as simple utopian 
fantasy), Baudrillard (1981: 51) indicates that the family was already hyperreal in their very 
selection for filming. The family was not randomly selected but rather represented a statistical 
aggregation of the ‘ideal American family’. Much like border subjects, in many ways, the family 
was ‘known’ and pre-selected as ideal subjects. They represented (through aggregated data) the 
characteristic ‘dividual’ of the American family.  
Baudrillard demonstrates how the ‘truth’ regarding the life of the family was ultimately 
replaced by the ‘truth’ of the TV. In short, the TV (much like the stretched screens of border 
agents) serves to render truth (Baudrillard 1981: 51-52). This, to Baudrillard, represents the end 
of the panoptic gaze and its replacement by “the manipulative truth of the test which probes and 
interrogates, of the laser that touches and then pierces, of computer cards that retain your 
punched-out sequences…” (p. 52). Much like the governance of borders through risk, it is no 
longer the historical narrative of the individual that matters, but rather the pre-coded and value-
laden assumptions within simulations that test perceived infallible data located in the dividual. 
This, according to Baudrillard (1981:52) represents the end of the panoptic system that relied on 
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a despotic gaze within a defined social space, and its replacement by a society of control that 
abandons attempts to render individuals transparent in favour of rending them predictable.  
As simulations shift governing efforts toward dividuals, it is no longer necessary for 
individuals to be always seen, heard, and recorded. Rather, it becomes necessary to develop a 
‘system of mapping’ whereby the collection of data contributes to controlling mobility vis-à-vis 
dividuals. The data characterizing dividuals comes to replace the panoptic image of the 
individual as the focal point of control. The individual does not need to be actively surveilled at 
physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be 
collected (including by non-state, third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the risk of the 
dividual and govern mobility with or without the physical presence of the individual. The 
population is no longer governed via the violence and surveillance of the state against individuals 
characteristic of disciplinary institutions. Rather, biopolitical post-panoptic governance unfolds 
as a system of deterrence designed to control the mobility of dividuals within simulations 
(Baudrillard 1981: 53-54). Submission of the individual is no longer necessary, as individuals are 
instead deterred from participating in ‘risky’ behaviours that have the potentiality of producing 
data points that could generate a risky dividual with a password excluding mobility.  
 
IDENTIFYING SIMULATIONS AND CYBORG WORK 
As Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter (2014) argue, there is a need for the literature to 
consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out 
duties related to it. The strength of theoretical perspectives (like the simulation of borders) can 
only be derived by considering how they function in relation to the everyday practice of 
‘bordering’. Recent analyses have examined how border officers in Canada employ risk toward 
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reaching determinations. This has included employing risk through advanced commercial 
information (Côté-Boucher 2013: 155-158) as well as surveillance technologies used to produce 
advanced identification of individuals (Côté-Boucher, 2008). A content analysis of training 
documents and manuals obtained by the researcher through ATIP requests filed with CBSA was 
performed to further test the simulation metaphor. According to the “Indicators” CBSA Port of 
Entry Recruitment Training (POERT)1 program module:  
One of the main purposes of indicators is to distinguish high-risk travelers from 
low-risk travelers. Through the use of questioning, document examination, 
lookouts, enforcement bulletins, intelligence bulletins, database results, and 
contraband detection tools, [officers] will be able to identify multiple indicators 
which will allow [them] to determine which travelers pose the highest risk (p. 1).  
 
When identity documents are scanned by officers into CBSA Integrated Primary Inspection Line 
(IPIL) computer systems, databases present officers with dividuals in return. Risk information is 
provided about dividuals that automatically leads to further customs and/or immigration 
processing and searches (irrespective of questions posed by the officer). Various alerts 
concerning the dividual – lookouts based on intelligence information gathered, previous customs 
seizures, previous immigration matters, outstanding arrest warrants, or lost or stolen identity 
documents – produce a level of risk that mandates further processing (CBSA 2015: 20-22). This 
is confirmed in the “Referrals” POERT module, which states, “A mandatory referral is a referral 
that a BSO must make for further documentation or examination by Customs… or on behalf of 
other government departments” (p. 23). The module then lists several types of mandatory 
customs referrals, including: 1) documentation/permit requirements, 2) payment of duties and 
 
1 Obtained POERT documents are still applicable for two reasons. First, the new OITP is built on the 
foundation of POERT. Second, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently 
on the frontline were trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher 
given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 
80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of OITP in 2014. 
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taxes, 3) inability of the officer to reach the point of finality with a traveler (including issues 
surrounding identity), and 4) when a lookout exists on a vehicle license plate or traveler name (p. 
23). This module also lists categories for individuals requiring a mandatory referral for 
immigration secondary, including (but not limited to): people included in inadmissible classes in 
sections 34 to 42 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for reasons of security, 
violating human rights, serious criminality, general criminality, organized crime, health, 
financial risk, and so forth (p. 3-7). By employing telematics, CBSA officers are able to reduce 
the transmission of data to zero. Dividuals (particularly in the case of lookouts) are produced in 
advance, including through aggregated risk information gleaned from third-party data collection, 
other agency intelligence information, and private citizen ‘tips’. Officers scan identity documents 
into databases and obtain histories in advance in the form of dividuals in return. The officer 
essentially has no choice in terms of action with mandatory referrals – the narrative of the 
individual is rendered irrelevant by the risky dividual (and incompatible password) visible on the 
officer’s screen.  
When border officers ask individuals questions related to their travel and associated 
declarations, agents are not asking questions to the individual (the body) to provide a narrative 
toward making a determination regarding mobility. Instead, officers are asking questions to the 
individual to essentially test the risk level of the dividual. Even if the individual provides low-
risk answers to queries, the high-risk dividual identified by IPIL databases mandates a referral 
with the assumption that the person is deceiving the agent and is not being forthcoming. As such, 
a high-risk dividual with a ‘hit’ in the database (as outlined above) will always result in a referral 
for further processing (regardless of how the individual answers questions) (CBSA 2015: 20-22). 
Conversely, if an individual provides high-risk answers despite their dividual presenting as a low 
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or unknown risk, they are also highly likely to be referred by the agent to test (and refine if 
necessary) the information contained in the dividual. Basically, the only way an individual is 
allowed to proceed without further scrutiny is if the low-risk answers they provide to questions 
confirm their low-risk dividual. Subsequent secondary customs and immigration searches and 
questioning serve to further ‘test’ and refine (as necessary) the dividual. In short, the ‘fate’ of 
travelers has been coded in databases and is largely determined before they reach physical 
borders or answer questions posed by officers.  
Additionally, most of the interactions occurring between border agents and individuals 
are coded and pre-determined in many ways. Officers ask a variety of pre-determined, 
mandatory questions designed (as stated above) to test the level of risk generated by the dividual. 
The social interactions that ensue cannot be described as ‘organic’ in any way. Travelers are 
limited in how they may answer these questions and ultimately personal narratives – which may 
serve to ‘clarify’ the individual – are excluded in favor of concise answers from which the officer 
may glean whether the individual presents the same level of risk posed by their dividual. If an 
individual refuses to present his or her dividual or answer questions and participate in the ‘test’, 
the traveler is automatically deemed risky and referred for further examination (and potentially 
detained or excluded). What may appear to the casual observer as an organic information-
seeking exercise is actually a highly coded and simulated interaction within a space of security.  
It is through such simulations based on advanced information and risk that border agents 
can be seen as participating in ‘cyborg work’ (Bogard 1992: 115) whereby perceived 
inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by 
governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce 
automated responses to dividuals without allowing for officer discretion. Despite the fact CBSA 
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officers indicate distrust for risk technologies and insist that they ultimately make determinations 
by asking questions (Côté-Boucher 2013: 172-179), it is without doubt that the lifeworlds 
(Habermas 1981) of border agents have been colonized by risk to the extent that it is virtually 
impossible for officers to reach common understandings regarding mobility without reference to 
the dividual.  
Recently, CBSA installed machines at borders in Canada that read RFID-enabled identity 
documents (and call forth dividuals) at a distance before individuals reach primary inspection 
(CBSA 2014: 37). Such technologies thrust risk calculations to the forefront of the primary 
inspection process, and provide officers with tailor-made risk-based decisions in advance of 
questioning. Where RFID readers are absent, agency policies mandate the manual scanning of 
identity documents and collection of data pertaining to “Name (first, middle, last), Date of Birth, 
Nationality/Citizenship, Gender, Document information (type, number and country of issuance)” 
as well as “Biographic Entry Data” for every individual officers process (CBSA 2016). 
According to Chapter One Part Two “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People Processing 
Manual, “All persons entering Canada at a site equipped with the IPIL system must be queried in 
IPIL. The officers must query each person by capturing the information from a machine-
readable travel document or by manually keying the person’s information” (p. 31, emphasis 
original). Furthermore, the introduction of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks at 
Canada’s busiest international airports in Vancouver (2009), Montreal (2012), and Toronto 
(2013) further indicate how Canadian borders and officer decision-making are governed via 
simulations and risk. According to Chapter 10 Part 2 “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People 
Processing Manual, travelers scan identity documents and self-declaration forms (E311) at ABC 
kiosks. The kiosks generate a risk score and referral code for the traveler, and:  
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The system generated results of the risk assessment and the traveler’s responses 
on the E311 [form] will determine if a referral to secondary processing is 
warranted. The kiosk will generate a receipt (copy of E311) and the traveler 
proceeds to the BSO performing document verification function to present their 
travel document and kiosk receipt… The BSO shall not release travelers if a 
secondary referral code is printed on the kiosk receipt but should direct the 
traveler to the BSO at triage (P. 151). 
 
Combined, RFID readers, policies mandating officers scan all identity documents, and ABC 
kiosks produce technologies of automation that serve to double-down on computerized risk-
management practices that govern the actions of officers vis-à-vis risk within the simulation. In 
short, risk management pervades and governs officer decision-making regardless of their 
perceived levels of complicity. While the aforementioned analysis pertains exclusively to CBSA, 
the employment of risk-management practices, databases, RFID technologies, and document 
readers by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Frontex, and other Western border agencies 
implies these practices are likely widespread. 
Additionally, the strength of the simulation metaphor for the governance of mobility and 
borders lies in its direct applicability not only to Canada Border Services Agency and other 
border agencies, but also to other fields of policing and security. Examples of such security 
simulation can be found in disaster and resilience planning scenarios that completely obscure the 
distinction between real and fake while supporting goals of maximal security and deterrence in 
making life programmatic (see for example Anderson 2010; Bourbeau 2013; Coaffee 2013; 
Walklate, Mythen, and McGarry 2012). Whether security actors are participating in scenarios or 
‘real-world’ events, their actions and behavior in each case become indistinguishable and guided 
through risk. O’Malley (2010) documents the increased use of ‘telemetric policing’ models such 
as traffic light cameras issuing fines to drivers through license plate databases. Such modes of 
policing replace the individual with the dividual as the focal point of power within ‘simulated 
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space’. Accordingly, such simulations ultimately serve to produce ‘simulated justice’ whereby 
individuals are no longer permitted recourse. In fact, the individual need not even be physically 
present at the time of the offence to be fined, with ‘deeming provisions’ within legislation 
placing a reverse onus on the ‘offender’ to prove “either that the vehicle was not speeding or that 
another dividual owned or drove it at the time of the offence” (O’Malley 2010: 800). Similarly, 
many policing agencies have now adopted intelligence-led policing models driven by data 
collection. Initiatives like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Program 
function by collating information from investigations and ‘other sources’ (i.e. phone records, 
bank statements, ISP data, and other third-party data) which is ultimately analyzed by criminal 
intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments (RCMP 2014). Such models of policing are 
inherently simulated and operate within the society of control in that, once again, the dividual 
serves as the unit of analysis in terms of identifying and acting on risk. Lastly, the use of ASBOs, 
licensing (Valverde 2003; Valverde 2012), zoning (Crofts et al. 2013; Hubbard and Colosi 2012; 
Valverde 2011), and recent innovations such as off-limits orders (Beckett and Herbert 2008; 
Palmer and Warren 2014) are employed in urban environments to control conduct vis-à-vis 
employing logics of risk and computerization in excluding dividuals from mobility within 
various public and private social spaces.  
Simply put, simulation not only characterizes how contemporary borders are governed, 
but rather is symptomatic of governance efforts generally within the society of control. Such 
reliance on technology and risk in producing simulations is troubling for several reasons. 
Simulations ultimately unfold at the will of software programmers. Taylor (2003), in examining 
virtual worlds, concludes that a simulated environment exists the way it does because a human 
being coded it to be so. The dangers for humans in terms of border simulations are easily 
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identifiable. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the ‘embedded values’ 
(Taylor 2003:28) promoted in a simulation’s coding. Such embedded values (including just what 
is considered ‘risky’) can be changed at the whim of the coder. In short, virtually any dividual 
can be rendered risky (and thus immobile) simply by re-coding the parameters of the simulation. 
Rather than risk locating the truth, what is ‘true’ becomes generated by risk, with risk being 
particularly vulnerable to social definition and construction in ways that are far from scientific or 
objective (Beck 1992:22-23). This conclusion raises further concerns about data ‘function creep’ 
(Haggerty and Ericson 2006) and a general lack of avenues for individuals to ‘exit’ simulations 
or seek judicial remedies for established risky dividuals. In short, simulations and the coding of 
dividuals render as fantasy any desire to manage or conceal ‘spoiled identity’ (Goffman 1963).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The aforementioned metaphor of simulation works for contemporary borders given it 
incorporates (as described above) each of the six principles agreed upon in the literature 
concerning contemporary border security. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites, 
simulation is ultimately employed to close the gap between virtual and physical governance of 
mobility. Risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, 
with dividuals ultimately produced in databases that serve as the unit of analysis for agents 
within the border security assemblage. To constantly acquire and refine data and thus also 
ascertain the level of risk posed by dividuals, a variety of third parties are responsibilized in 
collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state. These third parties are responsibilized along 
with the state in serving as part of larger security continua that rely (in part) on borders to 
securitize an ever-increasing range of social life in feeding into neoliberal demands for data 
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required for risk-management efforts focused on prediction and pre-emption. Such demands and 
the ‘routine failure of risk’, as Ericson (2007: 12) contends, simply produces further pressure to 
collect more data to feed the continuum and govern risk. Diffusion of the continuum (including 
borders) in securitizing additional non-traditional sites becomes necessary to feed the insatiable 
appetite for data. Risk and insecurity only produce more risk and insecurity in an ever-
amplifying spiral of securitization. Simulation, then, serves to make virtuality possible, 
producing dividuals, controlling mobility under the guise of perfect predictability, and 
securitizing more and more social life through risk. While aforementioned analysis exclusively 
considered the mobility of individuals, conclusions are transferable to mobility of all things 
governed through risk, including (but not limited to) financial instruments, commercial goods, 
and information. 
The simulation of borders also coincides with Deleuze’s (1995) description of the society 
of control. As institutions characteristic of disciplinary society are increasingly abandoned as the 
model of governance of individuals and masses, the dividual is produced within the society of 
control. Power in societies of control is exercised not through the individual within institutions, 
but rather through dividuals. The data characterizing dividuals comes to replace the panoptic 
image of the individual as the focal point of control. In terms of border simulations, the 
individual does not need to be actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions 
regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state 
third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the risk of the dividual, generate passwords, and 
govern mobility through control. 
Lastly, the simulation metaphor also avoids debates surrounding binary border mandates 
and geographic imaginaries that have plagued recent interdisciplinary border literature. 
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Simulation can accommodate (at the same time) the continued existence of traditional sovereign 
borders alongside ‘diffusion’ to a potentially infinite number of non-traditional and/or third-party 
sites. Debates surrounding the changing importance of physical borders within the context of 
telemetric borders are also irrelevant given that potentially each and every site contributes 
equally to the simulation of surveillance, the border security assemblage, and the production, 
analysis, and refinement of data doubles and dividuals. Each site (whether at the frontier of the 
nation state or elsewhere) is coded to govern flows and mobilities according to the simulation. 
Borders are not really ‘moving’ or ‘spreading’. Rather, simulated borders are truly anywhere and 
anytime as part of security continua that serve to securitize an ever-increasing range of social 
life. This is the major conclusion that Vaughan-Williams (2010) and de Lint (2008) do not fully 
consider in discussing the simulation of borders – namely, via simulation borders exist anywhere 
social life is already securitized, anywhere security continua have already reached, and anywhere 
life and mobility are already simulated. It is through this conclusion that Baudrillard’s (1981) 
dystopian supposition – that the true nuclear fallout is simulation of our entire social world – 
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